Financial Integration in East Asia by Hiroshi Fujiki & nd Akiko Terada-Hagiwara
 
 









INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES 
 
BANK OF JAPAN 
 




You can download this and other papers at the IMES Web site: 
http://www.imes.boj.or.jp 
 
Do not reprint or reproduce without permission. 
 
Financial Integration in East Asia 
 
 
Hiroshi Fujiki and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara 
 
 
























NOTE:  IMES Discussion Paper Series is circulated in 
order  to  stimulate  discussion  and  comments.  Views 
expressed in Discussion Paper Series are those of 
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of 
the Bank of Japan or the Institute for Monetary 
and Economic Studies.   IMES Discussion Paper Series 2007-E-12 
August 2007 
 
Financial Integration in East Asia 
 
 
Hiroshi Fujiki* and Akiko Terada-Hagiwara** 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the degree of integration into world financial markets and the 
impacts on several key macroeconomic variables of selected East Asian economies, and 
draws policy implications.  According to our analysis, the degrees of integration into 
world financial markets in those economies are increasing.  Regarding the impacts of 
increasing integration into world financial markets on several macroeconomic variables, 
we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among macroeconomic variables do 
not support the theoretical prediction of reduction in relative consumption volatility. 
Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than those of the euro area 
economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic shock by cross-holding of 
financial assets are lower than the euro area economies.  These results suggest two 
policy implications.  First, there is some room for improvement in welfare gains in 
those economies by means of further risk sharing. Second, holding all other conditions 
equal, the increasing integration into world financial markets alone is unlikely to 
provide a sound ground for a currency union in East Asia at this stage. 
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I. Introduction 
The wave of financial liberalization since the mid-1980s facilitated massive capital 
inflows to the Asian economies.    The capital inflows helped those economies to takeoff, 
but at the same time were blamed for the subsequent Asian currency and banking crisis.     
Since the crisis, Asian economies have recorded remarkable economic growth 
driven mainly by the region’s growth engine, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter, 
China) (Figure 1), and regional trade integration seems to have increased.  As distinct 
from the pre-crisis period, not only the larger economies but also the smaller ones have 
recorded fast growth with the expansion of the so-called vertical chain of production.  
This expansion is contributing to the rising intra-regional trade intensity index in the 
ASEAN and ASEAN+3 economies, despite the adverse effects of the East Asian 
financial crisis (Figure 2). 
The export-led growth in those economies supported by the capital inflows led to 
massive accumulation of gross foreign assets, especially in the form of foreign reserves, 
and the accumulation of gross foreign liabilities, especially in the form of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), as documented by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  The 
accumulation of gross foreign assets and liabilities, and the significance of valuation 
effects arising from exchange rate fluctuations, originally discussed in the context of 
“original sin,” constitute the core issues of global imbalance (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 
[2005a, b], and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti [2002 and 2004]).     
Motivated with regional trade integration and global imbalance in world financial 
markets, we ask the following questions in this paper.  First, have the degrees of 
integration into world financial markets in the Asian economies increased or not after 
the Asian currency and banking crisis?  Have the Asian economies benefited from the  2
increased integration into such markets?    And which exchange rate regimes should the 
Asian economies adopt given the active capital inflows and outflows?   
To answer these questions, we examine the degree of integration into world 
financial markets and its impacts on several key macroeconomic variables, and draw 
policy implications, paying special attention to the emerging market economies in the 
Executives' Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) group.
1   
In examining the impact of integration, we will employ relatively simple empirical 
methods in reduced forms rather than a fully specified general equilibrium model.    Our 
approach has the advantage that it is comparable with many previous studies, and that it 
can be reconciled with the lack of the consensus on the general equilibrium model to 
analyze the issue of global imbalance.
2 
Our analysis shows the following results on the degree of integration into world 
financial markets and its impacts on several key macroeconomic variables.  The 
degrees of integration into world financial markets in the EMEAP economies are 
increasing, according to our analysis of the database by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).   
Regarding the impacts of increasing integration into world financial markets on several 
macroeconomic variables, we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among 
macroeconomic variables hardly support the theoretical prediction of reduction in 
relative consumption volatility. Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than 
those of the euro area economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic 
                                                  
1  EMEAP, the Executives’ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks, is a cooperative organization of 
central banks and monetary authorities in the East Asia and Pacific region.    Its primary objective is to 
strengthen the cooperative relationship among its members.    It comprises the central banks of 11 
economies: Reserve Bank of Australia, People’s Bank of China, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Bank 
Indonesia, Bank of Japan, The Bank of Korea, Bank Negara Malaysia, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Monetary Authority of Singapore, and Bank of Thailand. 
2  Admittedly, the reduced form approach does not allow us to conduct welfare analysis. See, for example, 
Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (2000), and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) for discussion on this issue.  3
shock by cross-holding of financial assets are lower than in the euro area economies.     
These results suggest two policy implications.  First, there is some room for 
improvement in welfare gains by further risk sharing in the EMEAP economies. Second, 
holding all other conditions equal, the increasing integration into world financial 
markets alone is unlikely to provide a sound ground for a currency union in East Asia at 
this stage. 
The organization of this paper is as follows.  Section II documents the degree of 
integration into world financial markets through various measures.  These include the 
data on foreign assets and liabilities constructed in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006), a de 
jure measure by Chinn and Ito (2006, data untill 2003), and data on Coordinated 
Portfolio Investment Survey by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).  Section III 
presents a series of tests to illustrate the effects of integration into world financial 
markets.    We begin by examining several hypotheses, where that integration into world 
financial markets has some effects on key macroeconomic variables such as economic 
growth and consumption volatilities.  We then test the saving-investment nexus as 
claimed by Feldstein-Horioka (1980) to see whether the degree of international capital 
mobility has increased especially after the Asian financial crisis.  Further, we test 
risk-sharing hypothesis as in Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) (hereafter, ASY 
[1996]) in the international context and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) to see whether 
consumption growth smoothing is taking place as integration into world financial 
markets has been progressing in Asia.  In Section IV, we discuss policy implications 
particularly on exchange rate regimes in the EMEAP economies.  The final section 
concludes the paper. 
  4
II. Integration into World Financial Markets in East Asia   
This section examines trends of integration into world financial markets in the EMEAP 
economies by looking at several measures.  Particular attention is paid to the 
“EMEAP8” economies excluding the three high per capita income economies, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Japan.  We compare their trends of international integration into 
world financial markets with those in the euro area economies and other advanced 
economies.  In the following analysis, we refer to the euro area economies excluding 
Luxemburg and Slovenia as the Euro 11.
3    Our broadest sample of economies consists 
of the EMEAP economies, the Euro 11, Canada, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. 
(See Table 1 for the availability of the data series).   
 
A. External Assets and Liabilities to GDP 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) propose two ways of measuring degree of de facto 
integration into world financial markets.
4 The first measure is the ratio of the sum of 
external assets and liabilities to GDP (IFIGDP).  The second measure, GDOGDP, 
focuses on portfolio equity and direct investment: 
GDOGDP=(PEQA+FDIA+PEQL+FDIL)/GDP, where PEQA (PEQL) denotes the stock 
of portfolio equity assets (liability) and FDIA (FDIL) denotes the stock of direct 
investment  assets  (liabilities).   
Figure 3 shows the first measure of integration into world financial markets, 
                                                  
3  Data on Luxembourg is available only after 2000, and thus excluded from the following analysis.   
4  Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) construct a consistent series of external assets and liabilities, as well as 
capital inflows and outflows on the basis of residence principle for 145 economies over the period 
1970-2004.    The data are classified in the following five broad categories: (1) portfolio investment 
(ownership of shares of companies and mutual funds below 10 percent) subdivided into equity securities 
and debt securities (including bonds and money market instruments); (2) foreign direct investment (equity 
participations above 10 percent); (3) other investment (which includes debt instruments such as loans, 
deposits, and trade credits); (4) financial derivatives (the value of the outstanding derivative’s contract); 
and (5) reserve assets (foreign exchange, holdings of Special Drawing Rights, IMF).  5
IFIGDP over the period from 1970 to 2004.  Consistent with Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2006), IFIGDP accelerated its growth especially around the mid-1990s across all 
regions.   
Does the increase of integration into world financial markets observed in the data 
on aggregate the EMEAP economies apply to individual EMEAP economies?  To see 
this point, Table 2 shows the sample average of IFIGDP for each EMEAP economy for 
the period from 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, and 1995-99, and 2000-04.  The Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region (S.A.R.) of China (hereafter, Hong Kong) and 
Singapore have remarkably high ratios; however, they do not alter the overall trend 
indicating that IFIGDP increased irrespective of an economy’s initial degree of 
integration into world financial markets.     
Figure 4 shows the second measure: GDOGDP over the period from 1970 to 2004.   
The second ratio aims at checking whether the general increase in the degree of 
integration into world financial markets applies to the subgroup of portfolio equity and 
FDI holdings, because the trend observed in the first measure might be driven by special 
factors in international trade in debt instruments.   
The ratio had been stable until 1985, but started to rise from that year followed by 
a sharp acceleration beginning in 1996, except for 2001-02—replicating the finding in 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) for the industrialized countries, developing countries, 
and emerging countries.  Again, Hong Kong and Singapore have remarkably high 
ratios, but do not alter the overall trend.     
 
B. De Jure Measure 
We see another measure of capital account openness based on the information on  6
controls on financial flows to and from each economy, namely a de jure index, because 
the de facto (e.g., IFIGDP or GDOGDP) and de jure measures can deviate from each 
other for several reasons.  Indices measuring de jure integration into world financial 
markets, such as those by Chinn and Ito (2006, data untill 2003)
5  and Kose et al. (2006, 
data untill 2004), are usually constructed using the disaggregated capital and current 
account restrictions found in the annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) published by the IMF.
6   
Figure 5 shows two measures.  As opposed to the persistent upward trend in the 
de facto measure, there appeared a reversal in the progress of the current and capital 
account openness in the mid-1990s.    According to Chinn and Ito (2006), the reversal in 
the de jure measure is due to Indonesia and Malaysia.  This might reflect the 
introduction of a monitoring system for capital flows in Indonesia and a reimposition of 
controls on capital flows in Malaysia.  Nonetheless, the capital accounts have 
generally been kept open, and the de facto measure has continued to rise. 
 
C. Bilateral Financial Flows 
While both IFIGDP and GDOGDP exhibit clear upward trends, one could claim that 
this is due to increasing intra-regional integration, and not to world financial markets.  
As data on bilateral financial flows are still limited, it is hard to determine this claim.  
Nonetheless, the data series in the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey that the 
IMF compiles provides some insights on this issue.    The survey reports bilateral flows 
                                                  
5  Their index is the first principle component of the four IMF binary variables on multiple exchange rates, 
capital account, current account, and requirements to surrender export proceeds. For the extension of the 
four binary classifications after 1996, they follow Mody and Murshid (2005).   
6  Kose et al. (2006) use two financial openness variables. One variable is the financial openness variable 
as defined by Chinn and Ito (2006). The other variable is a binary indicator created by the authors based 
on data from the AREAER line E2, which signifies”restrictions on payments for capital transactions.”  7
in equity and debt securities for years 1997 and  2001-05.  The  data  are available for all 
the EMEAP8 economies except China. 
Table 3 reports, for the seven EMEAP8 economies, the average outward 
investment going to the EMEAP8 (minus the own-country) economies and to the G-7 
countries as a percentage of total outward investment.  On average, the EMEAP8 
economies invested about 16% of the total within the region, while almost half of the 
total investment went to the G-7 countries.    Within the investment flowing into the G-7 
economies, the United States was the major recipient.  Although the short sample 
period does not allow us to generalize as to trends, at the very least it is clear that 
despite the geographical proximity and the increasingly tightened trade link, the 
industrialized countries remain the major investment destinations for the EMEAP8 
economies rather than the neighbors. 
 
D. Capital Structure   
Given the increasing trend in the degree of integration into world financial markets, 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006) also show that a measure of capital structure, the ratio 
of equity (portfolio plus FDI) liabilities to total financial liabilities, has been also rising 
globally.  Figure 6 shows that the ratio for the EMEAP8 economies was quite stable 
until it started to increase in the 1990s.  In the other regions, EMEAP, Euro11 and all 
the sample economies, the ratio declined during the 1970s, but turned to an increasing 
trend in the 1980s followed by a rapid increase in the 1990s, consistent with the analysis 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  The trends in individual economies shown in 
Figure 7 are similar to the trend in the EMEAP8 aggregate, although the ratio for China 
did not drop even in 1997-98.    Regarding the composition of equity share, most of the  8
increase in external liabilities in China was explained by the FDI liabilities, rather than 
the portfolio equity liability.  The increase in FDI liabilities has been common in the 
EMEAP economies except for Indonesia and Korea where the growth in FDI liabilities 
has been slow. 
Behind the increase in equity share in total financial liabilities, we find a downward 
trend in debt liabilities, particularly in the 2000s (Figure 8 and 9).
7  However,  Figure  10 
shows that not all the EMEAP economies follow the downward trend in debt liabilities 
as in Figure 8  The ratio for Hong Kong generally increased untill 1990 and decreased 
steadily thereafter.  The ratio for Singapore increased steadily even from the 
mid-1990s.  For China, the ratio has been almost constant since 1990.  The ratio for 
the crisis-hit economies, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand, shows a trend 
similar to that observed in Figure 8 while a spike is recorded in Thailand in 1998. 
A notable change in the composition of gross foreign assets is the rapid increase in 
official reserves in the Asian economies, as can be seen in Figure 8.    We view the rapid 
increase as a region-wide phenomenon in the EMEAP8 economies.    Table 4 shows the 
sample average of the ratio of reserves to GDP for each EMEAP8 economy for the 
period from 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99, and 2000-04.  Hong Kong and 
Singapore have relatively high ratios, but, they do not alter the overall trend.     
Regarding the net foreign asset position, it is well known that the U.S. net external 
position has deteriorated while that of emerging economies has been improving (Lane 
and Milesi-Ferretti [2006, figure 7]).  Figure 11 shows that the recovery of the net 
foreign asset position applies to the EMEAP economies.  Hong Kong, Japan, and 
                                                  
7  Limitations of the data reported in the International Financial Statistics forces us to take the sample 
periods from 1982 to 2004 for the EMEAP8 economies minus Hong Kong, and 1998 to 2004 for the 
EMEAP8 economies in Figure 9.  9
Singapore remained net creditors after 1995, and China became a net creditor after 2003.   
While improving their net asset positions, the other EMEAP8 economies are still net 
debtors.  
 
E. Summary and Caveats 
This section summarizes the findings, and discusses some of the caveats deserving 
attention in the interpretation of our findings. 
 
1. Summary 
In sum, the EMEAP economies are more open to international financial markets, though 
the composition of assets and liabilities varies from economy to economy.     
We summarize the analyses of external assets and liabilities as follows.    First, our 
measure of de facto integration into world financial markets, IFIGDP (the ratio for the 
sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP), indicates that the integration has 
been progressing in the last 35 years, and this trend is especially strong after the 
mid-1990s.  The evidence from the bilateral financial flows indicates that about half of 
the outward investment of the EMEAP8 economies goes to the industrialized countries, 
while 16% on average flows into the EMEAP8 economies. 
Second, on liabilities side, the share of equity (portfolio plus FDI) liabilities in 
total financial liabilities has been rising for some of the EMEAP economies except for 
1997-98.  Third, the ratio of gross external debt to GDP varies from economy to 




We presented one widely accepted measure of the degree of financial integration using 
data by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  One shortcoming of the measure is that we 
can see a clear and increasing trend, say in Figure 3, but without a theoretical model we 
cannot determine the level of IFIGDP measure that corresponds to the state of financial 
integration.  One might argue that it would be better to conclude that financial 
integration is achieved if the expected risk adjusted returns from the same financial 
assets are equalized among economies.
8  We do not look at price measures based on 
cross-economy differences in the expected risk adjusted returns on the same financial 
assets, because domestic financial markets in some of the EMEAP economies do not 
seem sufficiently deep or liquid to allow efficient arbitrage of price differentials to take 
place (see Karolyi and Stulz [2003] for a survey on this issue).  Nonetheless, we 
acknowledge that it is important to look at both the quantity measure, as we do, as well 
as the price measure, as they complement each other.     
Another measurement issue is on the deviation between de facto and de jure 
measures.  As found in our analysis and in general, the two measures could deviate 
from each other.  When the deviation occurs, a usual treatment seems to favor the de 
facto measure over the de jure one.  Apparently, however, we should remember that 
both measures have loopholes; the de facto measure is subject to fluctuations in prices 
and output, while the de jure one is affected by the degree of enforcement of the 
controls. 
 
III. Integration into World Financial Markets and Risk Sharing   
                                                  
8  Cheung, Chinn and Fujii (2006), for example, examine the integration between China, Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, the United States, and Japan using this measure.  11
A. Integration into World Financial Markets, Growth, and Consumption 
Neoclassical economics predicts that integration into world financial markets would 
have certain effects on macroeconomic variables.  First, in a one-sector Solow-type 
growth model, integration into world financial markets leads to flows of capital from 
capital-rich economies to capital-poor ones and in the long run the steady-state output 
per capita and return on capital will be equalized.  If the inflow of new technology 
accompanies the inflow of capital, such technology will help the capital-poor economies 
grow faster.
9    Second, the effects of integration into world financial markets on output 
volatility are unclear, because integration has two offsetting effects on the 
country-specific shocks and industry-specific shocks depending on the stage of 
economic development.  Namely, integration into world financial markets allows 
capital-poor economies at an early stage of economic development, for example, 
specialized in agricultural production and susceptive to weather shock, to diversify their 
narrow production basis.  In a later stage of economic development, the integration 
into world financial markets and trade integration could simultaneously allow 
economies to specialize in particular industries according to their comparative 
advantages and makes those economies more susceptible to industry-specific shocks. 
Third, integration into world financial markets should unambiguously lead to reductions 
in the relative volatility of consumption, because it allows risk-averse consumers in an 
economy to smooth the effects from idiosyncratic fluctuations in income growth on 
consumption  growth.   
Figure 12 to Figure 15 plot our measure of integration into world financial 
markets, IFIGDP, against four macroeconomic variables of our interest.  Figure 12 
                                                  
9  Past studies, however, report that the welfare gain from receiving capital inflows is minimal. See 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), for example.  12
plots mean IFIGDP against mean growth rate of real GDP from 1980 to 2004.    Among 
the EMEAP8 economies, we do not see a clear positive correlation between the two 
variables, which is consistent with those reported in Kose et al. (2006) and also with the 
vast empirical literature providing little robust evidence of a causal relationship between 
integration into world financial markets and growth.  In Figure 13 to Figure 15, the 
three variables, GDP volatility, consumption growth, and consumption volatility, show 
negative relationships at first sight, but these relationships become unclear when 
excluding two very open economies, Hong Kong and Singapore.  The results here 
might be consistent with what theory predicts for GDP volatility.  However, the result 
for consumption contradicts what the theory predicts.
10 
 
B. Saving and Investment Correlation based on Feldstein and Horioka (1980)   
In this subsection, we test whether the saving-investment correlation increased or 
decreased before and after the Asian Crisis using the methods proposed by 
Feldstein-Horioka (1980). The general finding in the literature is that the 
saving-investment correlation falls as capital mobility increases (for a recent review and 
results including Asian economies, Kim, Kim and Wang (KKW [2007]).
11  
Using the statistics from the OECD and Asian Development Bank, we construct a 
data series for the ratio of gross domestic saving to GDP (hereafter S/Y) and the ratio of 
gross domestic capital formation to GDP (hereafter I/Y).
12   We show unconditional 
                                                  
10  Figures 12 to 15 use data from 1980 to 2004 except for Hong Kong, where data start in 1981, and 
Thailand and Malaysia, where 2004 consumption is missing. 
11  Feldstein (2005) argues that the drops in the saving-investment correlation after the mid-1990s apply 
to smaller OECD economies, but not to large economies.    When observations are weighted by each 
country GDP, the saving-investment correlation remains. 
12  Gross domestic savings are calculated as the difference between GDP and total consumption, where 
total consumption is the sum of private consumption and government consumption.  Gross capital 
formation is the total value of gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories and acquisitions less  13
means of S/Y and I/Y in Table 5 for three periods: 1981-2004, 1981-96, and 2000-04, 
which shows large drops in I/Y in 2000-04 compared with 1981-96 in the EMEAP8 and 
EMEAP economies.  One notable exception to this trend is China, whose investment 
rate does not fall in 2000-04.     
How should we interpret the significant drops of I/Y in 2000-04 that are not unique 
to East Asia?  Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2006) speculate that the post-crisis 
increase in savings and reduction in investment in many emerging market economies 
are a response of countries with weak financial systems to productivity shocks in the 
U.S.  The rise in U.S. productivity accompanied by reorganization of the global 
production mechanism and the global supply chain and trade has been transmitted to 
emerging market economies and raised their income.  But the weaker financial sector 
in emerging markets does not intermediate additional domestic savings to domestic 
investment.  
Armed with the annual time-series data for saving and investment from 1981 to 
2004, we derive a between estimator of saving-investment correlation proposed by 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), hereafter 
^
b , which is an estimator for equation (1): 


















it + ⋅ + = ∑ ∑
= =
  (1)  
where the subscript t denotes the period, subscript i denote country, and u is an error 
term.  We divide the sample into three periods: 1981-2004, 1981-96, and 2000-04.  
Table 6 summarizes the results.     
First row of Table 6 shows the results for EMAP8 economies.  The 
saving-investment correlation decreases after the Asian financial crisis, and the 
statistical significance becomes weak.    The second and third rows of Table 6 show the 
                                                                                                                                                  
disposals of valuables.    14
results for the EMEAP economies and all economies in our sample.  We confirm the 
reductions in the estimates of saving and investment correlations after the East Asian 
crisis.  The fourth row of Table 6 shows results for the Euro11 economies; we see no 
significant saving-investment correlation, but the coefficients take negative values for 
whole sample periods and subsample from 2000 to 04. 
For the sake of a robustness check, we choose five-year window beginning in 1981 
to run rolling regressions for the EMEAP8 economies, EMEAP economies, and all 
economies.  The results are summarized in Figure 16.  The figure shows that the 
saving-investment correlations and their lower bound of confidence intervals—the 
estimates of the coefficients minus 1.96 standard errors.  The saving-investment 
correlations started falling around 1993, and the lower bounds even became negative 
around the end of the 1990s.     
These results using the method of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) suggest the increase 
in the degrees of integration into world financial markets in the EMEAP economies 
after the Asian financial crisis, or between 2000 and 04.  However, it is important to 
note that this period corresponds to the large drops in I/Y relative to S/Y in some 
EMEAP8 economies, which contradicts the theoretical prediction that greater 
integration into world financial markets leads to capital flowing from capital-rich 
economies to capital-poor ones. 
 
C. Risk sharing   
Integration into world financial markets allows economies to share their idiosyncratic 
risks in consumption and improves welfare.   Empirical investigations on this point are 
abundant both for international and intranational risk sharing.  Kalemli-Ozcan,  15
Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) find, for example, the fraction of idiosyncratic shock 
smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex ante insurance) in the euro area was 
9% for the period between 1993 and 2000—a significant increase from small and/or 
almost negative estimates for the preceding years—possibly due to the creation of the 
euro area.  The general findings in the literature are scarce international risk sharing, 
where home bias in asset holdings is prevalent and consumption smoothing takes place 
essentially through domestic saving, and richer intranational risk sharing, where the role 
of capital markets sometimes became preponderant. 
Motivated by the evidence of increasing integration into world financial markets for 
the EMEAP economies in the previous sections, next we examine whether consumption 
risk sharing has improved in the region.  We examine the extent of risk sharing 
through two methods; the method by ASY (1996) in the international context and that 
of Ravallion and Chaudhri (1997). 
 
1. International Risk sharing based on ASY (1996) 
ASY (1996) propose the decomposition of cross-sectional variance in the gross product 
of an economy (originally applied to that of U.S. states) into four parts: fractions of 
shocks to gross state product smoothed via capital markets, fractions of shocks to gross 
state product smoothed by the federal fiscal system, fractions of shocks to gross state 
product smoothed by credit markets, and an unsmoothed residual fraction.  Sørensen 
and Yosha (1998) advanced ASY (1996) to an international setting and analyzed 
consumption smoothing among European Community (EC) and OECD economies 
during the period from 1966 to 1990.  They find that the contribution of  16
cross-economy factor income flows to cross-economy risk sharing among EC as well as 
OECD economies is not significantly different from zero.
13 
For an application of Sørensen and Yosha (1998) to Asian economies, KKW 
(2006), among others, report that the credit market channel is more important than that 
of international capital market.  For the sample of 10 Asian economies from 1970 to 
2000, they find that about 20% of the shocks to income is smoothed through the credit 
market channel while almost no smoothing takes place through the international capital 
market, leaving the rest unsmoothed.  We first extend their analysis to the EMEAP 
economies including more recent data to see whether this ex ante insurance via asset 
markets is in fact insignificant.     
Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), suppose that GDP for each economy is 
a homogeneous tradable good and an exogenous random variable.  Suppose further 
that the representative consumer in each economy is an identical risk-averse expected 
utility maximizer who obtains utility from consumption.    If the utility function is in log 
form, under full risk sharing, consumption of each economy co-moves with world 
consumption, but does not co-move with an economy-specific GDP shock.     
Suppose there is an international capital market and a citizen in one economy 
can own claims to GDP in the other economies, say, through stockholding, and the 
cross-economy factor income flow can smooth the income of the citizen in the lending 
economy.  In that case, under full risk sharing, the GNP of the lending economy 
co-move with the world consumption.  Even if the risk is not fully shared through 
cross-economy factor income flows, suppose there is a credit market.  Then a citizen 
can smooth consumption via savings and dissavings using the credit market, for 
                                                  
13  See also Mélitz (2004) for a useful survey of the literature, especially regarding evidence from 
European economies.  17
example, through bank deposits and under full risk sharing, consumption of each 
economy commoves with world consumption as a result.  We consider the 
consumption allocation under full risk sharing as a benchmark, and measure the fraction 
of shocks to GDP absorbed by the international capital market channel and credit 
market channel through the variance decomposition explained below. 
We consider the GDP identity for any period t.  Shocks to GDP are 











GDP = ,  (2)  
where all the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and i is an index of the economies.
14  
Following KKW (2006a), equation (2) can be transformed to estimate the following 
panel equation system (3) with seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). 
 
kt i t i k kt t i t i e GDP g d GNP GDP , , , , log log log + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ , 
ct i t i c ct t i t i e GDP g d C GNP , , , , log log log + ∆ + = ∆ − ∆ , 
ut i t i u ut t i e GDP g d C , , , log log + ∆ + = ∆ . 
(3) 
We interpret the degree of overall income and consumption smoothing against 
idiosyncratic regional shock to GDP of economy i as measured by three sources: (1) the 
fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets (ex ante 
insurance) measured by gk; (2) the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by the 
changes in savings and dissavings typically instigated by the credit markets after the 
realization of idiosyncratic shock, measured by gc; and (3) the fraction of idiosyncratic 
shock unsmoothed (namely, deviation of international consumption patterns from the 
full risk-sharing allocation) measured by gu and  1 = + + u c k g g g .
15 
                                                  
14  We ignore the role of international government transfer in the following analysis following KKW 
(2006). 
15  Note that the last equation of equation (3) is almost the same as Cochrane’s (1991) empirical model, 
which measures whether the consumption of economies responds only to aggregate shocks or not. The  18
Regarding the first source, if full risk sharing is achieved through international 
capital market channel, GNP of the economy co-moves with the world consumption and 
GNP is orthogonal to GDP of that economy.    In this case, we get gk = 1.     
Regarding the second source, if full risk sharing is achieved through the 
combination of the international capital market and credit markets, consumption of each 
economy co-moves with world consumption.    In this case gc measures the incremental 
fraction of shocks to GDP smoothed via savings and we get  0 g , 1 g g u c k = = + .  Time 
fixed effects in equation (3),  ut ct kt d d d , , , play a crucial role to capture the year-specific 
effects on the GDP growth rate, presumably the aggregate shocks to GDP of each 
economy. 
The first row of Table 7 shows the result for the period between 1981 and 2004. 
The credit market plays a larger role in smoothing shocks to GDP in the EMEAP8 
economies with more than 30% (the estimate of gc) while only about 6% of the shock to 
GDP is smoothed through the international capital market (the estimate of gk).  
Moreover, the larger values of standard errors for the parameter reported for the 
estimate of gk suggest that the smoothing effect from the international capital market is 
weak.
16  This trend—credit market being more important in Asia—is consistent with 
the finding of KKW (2006) and Jeon, Oh, and Yang (2005).
17 
Meanwhile, this trend is somewhat weak for 10 Euro area economies for the 
same period.  As the second row of Table 7 shows, about 24% is smoothed via credit 
                                                                                                                                                  
focus here is the measurement of fraction of region-specific GDP shocks absorbed through the various 
channels of international insurance. 
16  Our national account and population data is taken from the International Financial Statistics, while the 
purchasing power parity is from Penn World Table.    It is better to use GNP statistics that include the 
cross-economy factor income flow from the economies under consideration alone to be consistent with 
the theoretical model, but currently GNP statistics do not report the country breakdown of factor income 
from other economies.   
17  Each of the smoothed portions in their estimate is about half those of ours mainly due to the difference 
in the deflator used and partly to the difference in the countries included.  19
markets while 16%, more than double that of the EMEAP8, goes through the 
international capital market, although the larger value of standard error for the 
parameters prevents us from taking the results at their face value.
18  One might claim 
that the Asian economies are financially integrated more with the U.S. and Euro area 
rather than their neighbor economies in Asia, and these financial centers should be 
included in the estimation.  The results for risk sharing among the EMEAP (all 11 
economies), the U.S., and the Euro area combined are quite similar to the results based 
on the EMEAP8 economies. 
Figure 17 (the three panels) show the results of estimation of equation (3) 
respectively using 10-year subsamples.  Figure 17 shows that the fraction smoothed 
through the credit market channel peaked during the window of 1983-92, when major 
financial deregulation, particularly in the banking sector, took place in Asia.   
Meanwhile, the fraction smoothed through the international capital market, gk, was close 
to zero, and even experienced a sharp drop into negative territory from the mid-1980s to 
the early 1990s windows.    The drops in the 10-year sub-samples beginning from 1988 
may be partly due to the Asian crisis with the reversals of international capital inflows.   
While gk experienced a dramatic increase reaching above 30% of the total shocks to 
GDP, its significance is doubtful as gk is not significantly different from zero when 
looking at the 95% confidence interval. 
Figure 18 (the three panels) reports the result using all sample economies 
including EMEAP, the euro area, and the U.S.  The result is similar to the result in 
Figure 17 based on the EMEAP8 economies.  This result seems to be consistent with 
the finding by Kim, Lee, and Shin (2006), arguing that the economies of the Asian 
                                                  
18  See also Sørensen and Yosha (1998), though for a different sample period.  20
region are more integrated with global markets than with each other.    It may be fair to 
say, then, that what is developing in the region reflects what is happening in the global 
market.  These findings further confirm those found in the previous literature—the 
credit market channel is more important than that of the international capital market, 
and the degree of risk sharing among the EMEAP8 is far from complete, because the 
unsmoothed part of consumption against the idiosyncratic shock is around 60% on 
average according to our results. 
 
2. International risk sharing based on Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) 
We cross-check the result in the previous section using another way of measuring the 
degree of risk sharing.  Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) propose a way to measure a 
degree of village-wide risk sharing by examining household-level consumption and 
income data taking into account of the labor-leisure choice of households.  They posit 
that if the co-movement in consumption across families is being driven by risk sharing, 
and if the correlation between individual consumption changes and income changes is 
due to endogeneity of the labor-leisure choice, then the associated individual household 
consumption changes being correlated with aggregate income changes because the risk 
sharing implies the pooling of incomes.     
We apply their setup to risk sharing among the EMEAP8 economies.   
Specifically, we estimate the following equation (4): 






t i t GDP N GDP
1
, log 1 log   where N stands for the number of economies, 
and  0 ] log | ) [( , = ∆ + GDP u E t i t ε .  Equation (4) is equal to the third equation of  21





t i t GDP N GDP
1
, log 1 log , with the 
time dummy variable dut.    Hence, we should expect ) ( 1 c k u g g g + − = = β . 
The coefficientβ , attached to domestic output growth, measures the deviation from 
the risk-sharing arrangement, and the orthogonal coefficientα , attached to average 
output growth, measures the extent of risk sharing within the group of economies under 
consideration.   
  Table 8 reports the results for estimation of equation (4) using the data on the 
EMEAP8 economies for the whole sample period from 1981 to 2004 and by decade.
19  
For all the regression estimations, the estimates of  β   are more significant than those 
of  α , suggesting that while changes in an economy’s income have a significant effect 
on consumption, the effect of changes in the sample mean income differs from period to 
period.  The  estimates  of β   based on the sample period from 1981 to 2004 are close 
to the estimates of  u g  in Table 7.  The degree of international risk sharing as 
explicitly captured by α  does seem to increase in the recent years as has also been 
indicated by the estimation of the equation (3).  The significance of these coefficients 
may not be very robust when looking at the short subsample period with the higher 
standard errors accompanying the results, which is also consistent with the previous 
analysis.   
 
D. Summary and Reservations 
1. Summary 
The analyses in Section III provide us with supporting evidence for integration into 
world financial markets, and more limited progress in risk sharing within the EMEAP 
                                                  
19  All variables in the regressions are real in domestic currency and in per capita terms.  22
economies than the economic theory suggests.
20  Specifically, casual two-way plots 
between integration into world financial markets and several macroeconomic variables 
do not support the prediction of reduction in relative consumption volatility.   
Testing the saving-investment correlation proposed by Feldstein and Horioka (1980) 
suggests a significant increase in the degree of international capital mobility in the 
EMEAP economies during the years after the Asian financial crisis, but the 
saving-investment correlation in the EMEAP economies is higher than that in the euro 
area economies.  As for the international risk sharing, the analysis based on ASY 
(1996) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997) both indicate a possible increasing level of 
financial integration within the EMEAP8 economies.  The  significance  of  these  results 
remains to be addressed, however.   
 
2. Reservations 
Why does the increased integration into world financial markets not lead to clear-cut 
empirical evidence for better risk sharing and improvement of welfare in the EMEAP 
economies?    Regarding this question, several points are worth attention.     
First, the decreasing saving-investment correlation coefficient, 
^
b , that we find is 
subject to various explanations depending on which economic models we rely on.  
Thus, there are other ways of interpreting the result than the increase in financial 
                                                  
20 This main message—that global integration progresses, whereas regional integration remains 
weak—appears a robust one, as it is supported by other studies on financial integration using different 
integration measures, with a few exceptions.  For example, Forbes and Chinn (2004) find that stock 
returns have quantitatively important impacts on five major Asian economies, and the significant impacts 
result from the direct trade linkage.  Eichengreen and Park (2003) use a gravity model to explain the 
patterns of consolidated international bank claims reported to Bank for International Settlements that 
shows slower financial integration in Asia.    In contrast, Eichengreen and Luengnaruemitchai (2006) use 
a gravity model to explain the patterns of bilateral international portfolio holding measured by the IMF 
for 2001 to 2003. They find that the Asian bond markets are more integrated than a randomly selected 
pair of bond markets, holding other determinants of the bilateral international portfolio constant.  23
integration.    The Asian financial crisis, for example, forced current accounts to reverse 
in the affected economies, which would point toward the reduction of the 
saving-investment correlation coefficient.  Furthermore, the collapse of investment in 
recent years in most of the EMEAP8 economies with the exception of China contradicts 
the progress of financial integration.    To facilitate understanding of the correlation, van 
Wincoop (2000) suggests controling for common factors or global supply of funds.  
After controlling for the common factors, he claims that the saving-investment 
correlation approaches zero if markets are integrated.     
Second, the framework for measuring risk sharing may not be appropriate.  
Because of the rapid accumulation of foreign reserves, particularly during the post-crisis 
period, one might argue that “self-insurance” has occurred, and it is not surprising that 
international risk sharing of idiosyncratic shock is empirically insignificant.
21  In this 
regard, the EMEAP economies might have resorted to an alternative mechanism, or 
self-insurance through accumulation of assets, which requires an adjustment in 
consumption to idiosyncratic shocks. 
Alternatively, if the risk-sharing framework is based on incomplete financial 
markets instead of a complete market as is often the case in the previous studies, the 
level of risk sharing to be expected might be much lower.  Bai and Zhang (2005), for 
example, argue that the progress in financial integration would not lead to better risk 
sharing if it is accompanied by an increase in the probability of default.  For the risk 
sharing to occur, a country would need a much higher level of capital flows than the 
                                                  
21  As the EMEAP8 economies have been increasingly integrated as a way of production chain in trade, 
an idiosyncratic shock to one of final goods originating from non-EMEAP8 economies may spread over 
the other EMEAP8 economies, producing the intermediate input to the final goods.    In this regard, a 
common shock in the region might be a more relevant one to examine than an idiosyncratic shock, and 
one may interpret the rising estimates of α in the equation (4) as the result of the evolving production 
chain in the region.  24
level that is conventionally understood.
22,
23  In this regard, we admit that there are 
other benchmarks or the expected level of risk sharing to base our priors. 
The third point is the endogeniety of the quality of institutions, known as 
“collateral benefits” to the integration into world financial markets.  “Collateral 
benefits,” proposed by Kose et al. (2006), consists of a broad set of economic 
fundamentals that provide the benefits of integration into world financial markets in 
addition to the traditional channels (e.g., capital accumulation).    The collateral benefits, 
such as development of the domestic financial sector, improvements in institutions, and 
better macroeconomic policies, would play a dual role: they are prerequisites for the 
financial integration to occur, and a catalyst for higher growth and lower volatility. 
The collateral benefits as a prerequisite may be there for the EMEAP8 economies, 
but the level may not have achieved the “threshold” as in Kose et al. (2006) or be 
sufficiently high to serve as the catalyst for higher growth.  For example, compared 
with the euro area economies, the EMEAP8 economies so far have achieved only 
limited development toward a regional capital market, regional international institutions, 
and regional common economic policies.  A composite opacity index presented in 
Gelos and Wei (2005) indicates that the degree of opacity in areas such as accounting 
standards, macroeconomic policies, and legal systems of the average EMEAP 
economies is below the average of 30 developing economies if Singapore and Hong 
                                                  
22  Wyplosz (2007) interprets the accumulation of reserves by the EMEAP8 economies to mean that they 
have decided to trade off the benefits from an export-led strategy, based on exchange rate stability and 
external competitiveness, against the probability of renewed speculative attacks.    If the probability is 
low enough, which we do not know, the choice is reasonable.    Wyplosz (2007) agrees that accumulating 
foreign exchange reserves is one way of bringing down the probability, but warns that it is easy to 
imagine how a domestic financial distress or serious political turmoil could precipitate a speculative 
attack on the currency. 
23  Another possible explanation for lower expected risk-sharing in the context of incomplete financial 




IV. Implications for the Future of Currency Union in the East Asian Economies 
Can we learn any implications for the future of a currency union in the East Asian 
economies?  Our empirical results suggest that ample room remains for improvement 
in intra-regional risk sharing and welfare in East Asia.
25  Specifically, compared with 
the euro area economies, we find a higher saving-investment correlation, a lower degree 
of the fraction of idiosyncratic shock smoothed by cross-holding of financial assets, and 
a limited extent of risk sharing within the EMEAP8 economies.     
Given the lack of area-wide alternative mechanisms to cope with economy-specific 
shocks, such as coordinated fiscal policy and measures to make labor markets flexible, 
our evidence against the consumption smoothing mechanism via the international 
capital market and a credit market in Asia suggests that it is unlikely that a currency 
union in East Asia is a feasible solution, because a currency union takes away an 
important adjustment mechanism against idiosyncratic shock, namely, the adjustment of 
the bilateral nominal exchange rate.
26   
                                                  
24  The data are originally constructed by PricewaterhouseCoopers. The index is presented for only 6 
economies; Hong Kong, Indonesia,. Korea, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.    See the details in 
table AII, column 2 of Gelos and Wei (2005). 
25  Note that the integration into world financial markets is only one of the many important conditions for 
a currency union, such as the flexibility of the labor market and international transfer system to cope with 
an economy-specific shock. Moreover, the Asian economies do not have common strong political 
leadership moving toward a currency union compared with the European economies.  The lack of clear 
regional leadership leads some economists to wonder if China or Japan would really participate in such a 
union, if it is ever created.  For example, Fischer (2006) expects that the non-Chinese members would 
like to have a common currency so that they can achieve some impact on region-wide monetary policy, 
but it is unclear whether China would agree to such a currency.  Fischer also expects that Japan would 
play an independent role by retaining its currency, rather like the United Kingdom currently does in 
Europe. 
26  This paper does not deal with the debate over the appropriateness of the basket-peg proposal for Asian 
economies, because those papers generally focus on trade integration, rather than integration into world 
financial markets.  We list a few studies on the pros and cons for the basket peg below for reference.  
Kawai (2002) argued that (1) a system which ensures intra-regional exchange rate stability will be  26
Note that we examine the degree of financial integration in the context of 
preparedness for some currency union in the EMEAP economies.  This analysis, 
however, poses a question on the role of a common currency promoting financial 
integration—causality running from an opposite direction.  While  economies should be 
integrated to some extent before forming a currency union, it is generally understood 
that, particularly in the case of the euro area, the introduction of a common currency, the 
euro, helped significantly to promote further integration.  In this sense, other factors 




V. Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the degree of integration into world financial markets and its 
                                                                                                                                                  
beneficial for emerging East Asia to promote trade, FDI, and economic growth; (2) given the high degree 
of intra-regional trade and the rising similarity of trade composition in East Asia, each economy’s 
exchange rate policy should be directed toward maintaining intra-regional exchange rate stability (see 
Branson and Healy [2005] for the same argument and see the opposite argument in Sa and Guérin 
[2006]); and (3) the diverse economic linkages of emerging East Asia with the rest of the world suggest 
that exchange rate stabilization vis-à-vis a well-balanced currency basket comprising the U.S. dollar, the 
yen, and the euro is a reasonable option. Ogawa and Kawasaki (2006) examine the cointegration 
relationship among real effective exchange rates and find that after the East Asian crisis the yen became 
one of the currencies to be included in the currency basket that stabilized the other Asian currencies.  
They argue that the results suggest that the common currency basket arrangement for the ASEAN plus 
three economies should include the yen. Yoshino, Kaji, and Suzuki (2004) provide an example that the 
choice of exchange rate regime depends on the choice of policy objectives, and a basket peg with trade 
weight in general is not the best choice.  Shioji (2006) examines the optimal weight for East Asia’s 
currency basket peg to the dollar and the yen based on a three-economy version of the new open-economy 
macroeconomics model for Asia, Japan and the U.S.  According to his model, the weight of the basket 
peg depends not only on the trade share that the traditional literature of basket peg emphasizes on, but 
also on the choice of invoicing currency.  Shioji (2006) concludes that under the invoicing currency 
pricing, East Asian economies should assign more weight to the yen, rather than the standard assumption 
of the seller’s currency pricing.  The results of Shioji (2006) highlight the importance of the 
understanding on the choice of invoice currency and the degree of pass-through in Asia.  See Parsons 
and Sato (2005) and Ito and Sato (2006) on the degree of pass-through. 
27 A  related issue is the reference region to use.    We examine the euro area as a reference region, but if 
the endogeniety of the currency union is really significant, then the reference should be the region where 
a currency union has not been put into place.    Regions such as Latin America might be relevant in this 
regard. 
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impacts on several key macroeconomic variables for selected East Asian economies, 
and draws policy implications.  According to our analysis, the degrees of integration 
into world financial markets in those economies  are  increasing.  Regarding  the  impacts 
of increasing integration into world financial markets on several macroeconomic 
variables, we find three results.  First, casual two-way plots among macroeconomic 
variables do not support the theoretical prediction of reduction in relative consumption 
volatility. Second, the saving-investment correlation is higher than those of the euro area 
economies. Third, the degrees of smoothing of idiosyncratic shock by cross-holding of 
financial assets are lower than in the euro area economies.  These results suggest two 
policy implications.  First, there is some room for improvement in welfare gains in 
those economies by means of further risk sharing. Second, holding all other conditions 
equal, the increasing integration into world financial markets alone is unlikely to 
provide a sound ground for a currency union in East Asia at this stage.  28
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Table 1 Country Group and Data Availability   






























China yes yes yes 1980 1980 1981 1981 1981 1981 n.a. n.a. 1977
Hong Kong  y e s y e s y e s 1 9 7 91 9 7 91 9 7 91 9 7 91 9 7 91 9 7 92 0 0 02 0 0 0
Indonesia yes yes yes 1979 2002 2002
Korea yes yes yes 2001 2001
Malaysia yes yes yes 2001 2001
Philippines yes yes yes 1980 1980 2001 2001
Singapore yes yes yes 2001 2001
Thailand yes yes yes 2000 2000
Australia yes yes 1986 1986
New Zealand yes yes 2000 2000
Japan yes yes 1995 1995
Austria yes yes 1994 1994
Belgium yes yes 1995 1995
Finland yes yes 1993 1993
France yes yes 1994 1994
Germany yes yes n.a. n.a.
Greece yes yes 1986 2000 2000
Ireland yes yes 2001 2001
Italy yes yes 2000 2000
Netherlands yes yes 1999 1999
Portugal yes yes 1972 1972 1996 1996
Spain yes yes n.a. n.a.
Canada yes n.a. n.a.
Switzerland yes n.a. n.a.
United Kingdom yes n.a. n.a.
United States yes n.a. n.a.
Group Data sample starting year (Blank indicates 1970 unless indicated otherwise)
  
Note: n.a.=Not available 34
Table 2 The Ratio for the Sum of External Assets and Liabilities   
Divided by GDP (IFIGDP)   
Period of the data 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
China 0.134 0.230 0.448 0.707 0.932
Hong Kong  5.035 11.233 13.535 11.883 12.276
Indonesia 0.407 0.716 0.836 1.297 1.177
Korea 0.663 0.532 0.393 0.737 0.947
Malaysia 1.045 1.397 1.493 1.780 2.035
Philippines 0.858 1.070 1.045 1.192 1.418
Singapore 2.266 3.473 3.634 6.050 9.266
Thailand 0.455 0.626 0.865 1.042 1.334
Australia 0.452 0.861 1.112 1.453 2.036
New Zealand 0.642 1.218 1.514 1.823 2.223
Japan 0.386 0.790 0.964 1.042 1.184
EMEAP8  0.624 1.243 1.695 1.930 2.030
EMEAP  0.469 0.905 1.151 1.333 1.535
 
Note: IFIGDP is 5-year sample average. 35













Note: Percent of total value of investment, 5-year sample average 2001-05.  36
Table 4 Rratio for the Reserves Divided by GDP:   
1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04
China 0.035 0.043 0.072 0.143 0.246
Hong Kong 0.196 0.275 0.347 0.495 0.706
Indonesia 0.048 0.057 0.070 0.130 0.176
Korea 0.034 0.043 0.053 0.096 0.234
Malaysia 0.144 0.201 0.297 0.297 0.405
Philippines 0.042 0.033 0.071 0.120 0.171
Singapore 0.544 0.704 0.800 0.849 0.952
Thailand 0.045 0.086 0.186 0.226 0.285
EMEAP8  0.063 0.087 0.135 0.197 0.299
 
Note: Sample average from 1981-90, 1991–2000, 2001–04.  37
 
Table 5 Unconditional Mean of Saving and Investment 
Sample 
Mean(I/Y)Mean(S/Y)Mean(I/Y)Mean(S/Y)Mean(I/Y)Mean(S/Y)
EMEAP8 30.260 33.298 31.982 32.748 25.750 33.988
(s.e.) (7.640 ) (8.778 ) (7.064 ) (8.231 ) (7.182 ) (8.280 )
EMEAP 28.871 30.392 30.319 30.132 25.146 30.600
(s.e.) (7.110 ) (9.389 ) (6.878 ) (8.885 ) (6.223 ) (9.194 )
All 24.851 25.036 25.532 24.738 23.087 25.332
(s.e.) (6.486 ) (8.361 ) (6.825 ) (8.098 ) (5.150 ) (8.358 )
Euro11 22.394 21.281 22.416 20.967 22.324 21.573




Table 6 Saving-Investment Correlation 
Sample 
(s.e.) (s.e.) (s.e.)
EMEAP8 0.572 0.108 0.674 0.093 0.401 0.289
EMEAP 0.521 0.071 0.625 0.064 0.302 0.183
All 0.574 0.071 0.712 0.066 0.264 0.106
Euro11 -0.080 0.438 0.438 0.405 -0.453 0.290
1981-2004 1981-96 2000-2004
b ˆ b ˆ b ˆ
   39
Table 7 Estimation Result of Equation (3) (1981–2004) 
  gk g c  gu 
EMEAP8  0.062 (0.062)  0.308 (0.124)  0.622 (0.068) 
Euro10  0.160 (0.124)  0.240 (0.128)  0.603 (0.126) 
G-7  0.030 (0.111)  0.169 (0.177)  0.801 (0.177) 
EMEAP, the U.S. and Euro10  0.060 (0.051)  0.303 (0.079)  0.636 (0.053) 
Note: Standard errors are in brackets. Euro 10 economies includes 10 countries excluding 
Luxembourg, Greece, and Slovenia.    40
Table 8 Estimation Result of Equation (4) for EMEAP8 
Sample   Country  i 
GDP (β ) 
(s.e.) EMEAP8 
average GDP (α ) 
(s.e.) Wald  test 
( ) 2 (
2 χ ) 
1981–2004 0.608  (0.057)  0.206  (0.071)  203.34 
1980s 0.627  (0.063  0.037  (0.092)  196.72 
1990s 0.777  (0.088)  0.195  (0.112)  280.55 
2000s 0.498  (0.128)  0.292  (0.133)  45.45 
Note:  
The coefficientβ , attached to domestic output growth, measures the deviation from risk sharing 
arrangement for idiosyncratic GDP shocks within the economies, and the coefficientα , attached to 
aggregate output growth, measures the extent of risk sharing within the group of economies under 
consideration.  41































Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook (WEO) database for gross 
domestic product (constant prices, annual percentage change).  42




















An index of more than one indicates that trade flow within the region is larger than expected given 
the importance of the region in world trade.    The index is defined as the ratio of intra-regional trade 
share to the share of world trade with the region.  The index is calculated using export data, and 
determines whether trade within the region is greater or smaller than should be expected on the basis 
of the region's importance in world trade.   
Source: Asian Development Bank, Regional integration indicator database.  
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Note: The ratio for the sum of external assets and liabilities divided by GDP.  44
















The ratio for stock of portfolio equity assets and liabilities and stock of direct investment assets and 
liabilities divided by GDP.    45
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De facto index (EMEAP8
Aggregate IFIGDP)
De jure (left scale)
De facto (right scale)
 
Note:  
De jure measure is the one created in Chinn and Ito (2006).    De facto measure is IFIGDP proposed 
by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2006).  46
 


















Note: Share of equity (portfolio plus FDI) liability in total financial liabilities.    47




















Note: Share of equity (portfolio plus FDI) liabilities in total financial liabilities.  48
 
















Figure 9 Gross External Debt and Official Reserves   
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Figure 12 Integration into World Financial Markets and GDP Growth Rate 
y = -0.167x + 3.6848










2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0











Note: GDP growth rate (domestic currency, constant price) from the IMF WEO database.  53
Figure 13 Integration into World Financial Markets and GDP Volatility 
y = -9.7303x + 6.6239
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Note: Coefficient of variation of GDP (domestic currency, constant price) from the IMF WEO 
database.   54
 
Figure 14 Integration into World Financial Markets and Consumption Growth 
y = -1.2336x + 10.689





















Household consumption growth in domestic currency deflated by CPI. Data are taken from 
International  Financial  Statistics.    55
Figure 15 Integration into World Financial Markets and Consumption Volatility 
y = -17.962x + 9.7415
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Coefficient of variation of level of household consumption in domestic currency deflated by CPI. 
Data are taken from International Financial Statistics.    56
 



























































Estimation results using a window of 10 years for the EMEAP8. Dotted lines indicate 1.96*standard 
error plus/minus the estimated coefficients, gk, gc, and gu. 58





































Estimation results using a window of 10 years for euro area + Asia + United States. Dotted lines 
indicate 1.96*standard error plus/minus the estimated coefficients, gk, gc, and gu. 